Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Iv Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine by Denning, Brannon P.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2003
Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article Iv Cannot Replace the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine
Brannon P. Denning
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Denning, Brannon P., "Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Iv Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine" (2003). Minnesota Law Review. 711.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/711
Essay
Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine
Brannon P. Denningt
A perennial object of judicial and academic brickbats,1 the
t Associate Professor, Cumberland School of Law at Samford Univer-
sity. This Essay was substantially completed while I was an Assistant Profes-
sor at Southern Illinois University School of Law. Thanks are due to Jim
Chen, Dan Farber, Pat Kelley, and Bob Pushaw for perceptive comments on a
previous draft. Joel Goldstein's comments and criticisms encouraged me to
sharpen several of the arguments made here; to him special thanks are due.
Tiffany Ritchie, J.D. 2003, SIU School of Law, provided able research assis-
tance.
1. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the DCCD "makes little
sense" and "has proved virtually unworkable in application" stemming in part
from the fact that it "has no basis in the text of the Constitution"); Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the DCCD finds no sup-
port in the Constitution's text, structure, or history); Michael DeBow, Codify-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 69, 73 ("The basic
problem raised by the Dormant Commerce Clause is that it has no basis in the
text of the Constitution."); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dor-
mant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569, 571 ("Our position is that ... there is no dormant commerce
clause to be found within the text or textual structure of the Constitution."
(citation omitted)); Note, Functional Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537, 1537 (1997) ("The lack of clarity in
the Court's dormant commerce clause opinions largely results from the ab-
sence of any 'clear theoretical underpinning,' the dormant commerce clause
developed.., out of an ad hoc administrative concern that Congress would be
unable to fend off states' efforts at protectionism without the courts' help." (ci-
tations omitted) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 262)); Amy M. Petrag-
nani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1215, 1216 (1994) (arguing that the doctrine is "absolutely without sup-
port in the text of the Constitution or the intent of the Framers"). For a
thoughtful discussion of the current criticisms of the DCCD, including those
from Justices Scalia and Thomas, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2 (3d ed. 2000).
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) 2 is also frequently
the object of would-be reformers eager to reroute rivers of doc-
trine to cleanse what many feel is constitutional law's equiva-
lent of the Augean Stables.3 One popular solution-suggested
in an oft-cited article by the late Professor Julian Eule4 and
2. The DCCD is the name given to the self-executing limitations inferred
from the Commerce Clause and applied by courts to prohibit states from
adopting legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens in-
terstate commerce. See generally BORIS I. BirrTKER, BITTKER ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §§ 6.01-6.08 (1999 &
Supp. 2003) (discussing the development of the DCCD). The modern DCCD
protects interstate commerce from discriminatory or protectionist taxation and
regulation imposed by states. See S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S.
160, 169 (1999) (observing that facially discriminatory taxes violate the Con-
stitution absent certain justifications); Camps Newfound/ Owatonna, Inc., 520
U.S. at 595 (striking down a discriminatory tax exemption); Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 346-47 (1996) (invalidating discriminatory corporate
tax); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 385-95 (1994) (striking
down regulations barring export of solid waste); Brown-Forman Distillers v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (striking down a price af-
firmation statute requiring liquor to be sold in-state at prices no higher than
those charged out-of-state); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (holding that regulations embodying "simple economic protectionism"
are "virtually per se invalid"). Nondiscriminatory state regulations can be in-
validated if their burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive" when
balanced against "the putative local benefits" conferred by the regulation. Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The DCCD has also been em-
ployed to protect interstate commerce from state regulations that, if multi-
plied, could result in an impermissible burden on that commerce, or that regu-
late "extraterritorially," that is, beyond the boundaries of the legislating state.
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-43 (1989); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 671-75 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 527-30
(1959); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945). In addition to pro-
tecting interstate commerce from discriminatory taxes, the DCCD also pre-
vents states from imposing unapportioned taxes. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n
v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 282 (1987) (invalidating unapportioned flat fees and
axle taxes that produced discrimination against interstate commerce). More-
over, in order to tax interstate commerce, the state must have a sufficient con-
nection with the activity taxed, and the tax must be "fairly related" to state
benefits provided to the taxpayer. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (upholding a privilege tax on gross receipts as
applied to a corporation in the business of transporting automobiles from
Jackson, Mississippi, to in-state car dealerships).
3. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (describing the DCCD as a "morass"); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the
DCCD as a "quagmire"); Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the application of the DCCD
"makes no sense"); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 706 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the DCCD is "hopelessly confused").
4. Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
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once offered by no less a judicial Hercules than Justice
Scalia 5 -is to abandon the DCCD altogether and combat dis-
crimination against interstate commerce by relying solely on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.6
L.J. 425, 446-47 (1982) ("If we are willing to redirect judicial energies from
preserving commerce to protecting process, the express commands of the
'privileges and immunities clause' of Article IV of the Constitution seem a
more appropriate foundation from which to launch such an effort than the si-
lences of Article I." (citation omitted)); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspec-
tives on the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 59, 65 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981) ("It might.., be
that [enforcement of an antidiscrimination principle in interstate commerce]
should find its doctrinal base in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Arti-
cle IV, rather than in the negative inference from the Commerce Clause.");
Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 623 (1990) ("State action which discriminates against out-
of-state commerce should still be prohibited, perhaps under the force of article
IV's privileges and immunities clause.").
5. Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 264 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that "rank discrimination against citizens of other
States" is not regulated by the Commerce Clause, but by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV).
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be en-
titled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
Another candidate for combating state discrimination is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At least once, the Court struck
down a discriminatory state regulation of insurance on equal protection
grounds. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (concluding
that taxation of out-of-state corporations to protect domestic industry was not
a legitimate state purpose). Since the regulation concerned the insurance in-
dustry, the DCCD was unavailable, because the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1011, permits state regulation of insurance that would otherwise be
prohibited by the DCCD. Moreover, since the appellant was a corporation, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was similarly unavailable,
because the Clause has long been interpreted to exclude corporations from its
protections. See infra Part II. The Court's decision drew a strong dissent from
Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist. See Ward, 470 U.S. at
883-902 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The decision was also in tension with an
earlier decision of the Court upholding a retaliatory tax imposed by California
on out-of-state insurance companies whose home states discriminated against
California insurers doing business in those home states. See W. & S. Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 655-74 (1981). There, the Court
specifically upheld California's retaliatory tax against an Equal Protection
Clause challenge by concluding. that the state's purpose in imposing the tax
was legitimate, and that legislators could have rationally believed that the
measure would achieve that purpose. Id. at 671-74. Even after Ward the
Court upheld laws favoring New England banks over those from other regions.
See Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 162-75 (1985). In
Northeast Bancorp, the Court distinguished Ward by noting that the Alabama
statute in Ward discriminated against all out-of-state insurance companies,
not just those outside a particular region of the country. Id. at 177-78.
In general, the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Due Process
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For Justice Scalia, this would solve two problems with the
DCCD: (i) it would provide a textual peg authorizing courts to
7
enforce a limitation on state power; and (ii) it would restrict
the courts' enforcement to instances of discrimination by one
state against out-of-state commerce. It would relieve courts, so
goes the argument, of engaging in policy-laden analyses mas-
querading as "balancing tests."8 This solution is entirely consis-
tent with Justice Scalia's (and other conservatives') preference
for rules over more mutable standards. 9
Clause, places a heavier burden on plaintiffs to prove illegitimacy of purpose
or irrationality of the means to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a classification trammels fundamen-
tal personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the
statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest."); see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955). Because of this deferential review of
state "economic and social legislation," the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses-Ward notwithstanding-are not as potent as the more searching
standards of review under both the DCCD and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause for challenging discrimination against out-of-state commerce.
[Tihe Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausi-
ble policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which
the classification is apparently based rationally may have been con-
sidered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the rela-
tionship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to ren-
der the distinction arbitrary or irrational.
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2159 (2003) (quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992) (citations omitted in original)).
7. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the DCCD's incoherence has, in part, stemmed from
lack of textual foundations); cf Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the term "negative"
is more appropriate than "dormant" to describe the DCCD because the DCCD
does not appear in the text of the Constitution).
8. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "balancing" interests is not possi-
ble because the interests balanced are incommensurate: "It is more like judg-
ing whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."); see
also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 620 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that balancing under the DCCD invited improper "policy-laden
decisionmaking" in which the Court functions as a legislature, rather than as
a judicial body).
9. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, Fore-
word: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 24, 65 (1992)
(describing Justice Scalia as the Court's leading proponent of rules versus
standards); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1182 (1989) (arguing that when judges eschew rules for
standards, "equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and ... impossi-
ble to achieve; predictability is destroyed; and judicial arbitrariness is facili-
tated; judicial courage is impaired").
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The very simplicity of the proposed solution (hereinafter
unimaginatively referred to as "substitution") is at once its
most attractive and most deceptive feature. In reality, the sub-
stitution solution offers no solution at all. Advocates of substi-
tution either conceal or fail to appreciate the problems result-
ing from refashioning the Privileges and Immunities Clause as
a vehicle for enforcing the DCCD's prohibition on state dis-
crimination against interstate commerce. As will be shown,
substituting the Privileges and Immunities Clause for the
DCCD would neither be a simple matter nor an even trade.
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes the history of Arti-
cle IV, Section 2 and traces its doctrinal development. While
Article IV, Section 2 and the DCCD overlap to a degree, Part II
details the gaps that would arise from abandoning the DCCD.
Part III analyzes the response, if any, given by substitution's
advocates to the problems attending implementation of their
remedy. I note that to the extent the shortcomings of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause as a replacement for the DCCD
are noticed, substitution advocates are often quick to offer solu-
tions that play fast and loose with text and history, or that curb
the powers of Congress and the states-precisely the com-
plaints lodged against the DCCD itself.'° A brief conclusion fol-
lows in Part IV.
I.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV origi-
nated in the Articles of Confederation." Its principles were ap-
10. This Essay is a twin of an earlier essay in which I analyzed Justice
Thomas's suggestion that the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution be
substituted for the DCCD. I concluded that Justice Thomas was probably cor-
rect-inasmuch as he argued that the Clause was intended to restrain state
imposts and duties on interstate as well as foreign commerce-but that his
remedy would radically prune the scope of protection afforded interstate com-
merce under the DCCD. See Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-
Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 155, 157-60 (1998).
11. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. IV (U.S. 1781). Article
IV (i) granted to citizens of each state the rights of "free ingress and regress"
to and from the several States; (ii) guaranteed the "privileges of trade and
commerce" in the states on the same terms as citizens of those states; and (iii)
secured the right to remove "property imported into any state, to any other
state" inhabited by the owner of that property. Id. This Article apparently had
.no clear colonial antecedent," and its appearance in the Articles is the subject
of some speculation. See Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66
TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1121-27 (1988). For an account of Article IV, Section 2's
[Vol 88:384388
2003] PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 389
parently so well accepted that they were included in the Consti-
tution without debate at the 1787 convention." It barely war-
rants mention in The Federalist, though Alexander Hamilton
called it "the basis of the Union" in his defense of federal court
jurisdiction over diversity cases."
The earliest judicial interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause came in 1823. In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice
Bushrod Washington, sitting on circuit, offered the following
gloss on just what "privileges and immunities" the Clause pro-
tected: "The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to
reside in any other state for purposes of trade, agriculture, pro-
fessional pursuits, or otherwise ... [and] exemption from the
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens
of the state." 4 Nearly a half-century later, the focus of the
Clause was still understood as removing unfair disabilities
from outsiders, especially those burdening one's ability to con-
duct trade or make a living upon crossing into a new state. The
"object," according to the Court, was
to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens
of other States .... [Article IV, Section 2] inhibits discriminating leg-
islation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free
ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those
States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit
of happiness .... "
In the years following Corfield, most of the cases in which
the Clause was applied touched on one of the areas mentioned
in Justice Washington's opinion: (i) the right of out-of-staters to
conduct commerce on the same terms as in-state residents; (ii)
the right of an out-of-stater to pay no higher taxes or exactions
than in-state residents; and (iii) the right to pursue a profes-
sion on the same terms as in-state citizens. 6 These cases make
framing, as well as its antecedents in the Articles of Confederation, see David
S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 794 (1987).
12. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 443 (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
14. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(Washington, C.J.).
15. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
16. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (striking
down a state law requiring state residence for admission to the bar); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948) (invalidating a discriminatory license fee on
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clear that discrimination against outsiders, particularly where
that discrimination burdens one's ability to carry on trade or
commerce, or to pursue a profession, is prohibited."
Modern Privileges and Immunities Clause doctrine can be
traced to the Court's 1948 decision in Toomer v. Witsell.18 There
the Court invalidated a South Carolina law obliging out-of-
state shrimpers to pay a license fee one hundred times greater
than that paid by in-state fishermen. 9 The Clause, wrote the
Court, "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ven-
tures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of
State B enjoy," including the right to do business in State B "on
terms of substantial equality" with State B's citizens.20 "Sub-
stantial equality" meant that if State A's residents were treated
differently, there must be "perfectly valid independent reasons"
for the difference, and the "degree of discrimination [must]
bear[] a close relationship" to the differences.2 The Court found
that no such reasons existed for the South Carolina law.
Over time, Toomer's test has been refined, but its essence
remains the same. If there is discrimination between residents
and nonresidents, 2 (i) there must be a "substantial reason" for
out-of-state commercial shrimpers); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,
432 (1870) (striking down a discriminatory tax on nonresident merchants).
17. See, e.g., Piper, 470 U.S. at 281 (holding that "the practice of law falls
within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause"); Toomer, 334 U.S.
at 403 (holding that "commercial shrimping... like other common callings, is
within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause"); Ward, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) at 430 (holding that the Clause provides nonresidents the ability to
"lawfully sell ... any goods which the permanent residents of the state might
sell.., without being subjected to any higher tax or excise" than permanent
residents of the state).
18. 334 U.S. 385.
19. Id. at 389.
20. Id. at 395-96.
21. Id. at 396.
22. Throughout this Essay, I assume that explicit discrimination between
in-state and out-of-state citizens (as opposed to facially neutral legislation that
is discriminatory in effect) is a threshold requirement for invoking the protec-
tions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. I have found no case in which
the Supreme Court struck down a facially neutral state law under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause on the ground that it nevertheless had the effect
of discriminating against out-of-state citizens. The Court seemed to suggest
that facial discrimination was a requirement for invoking Article IV, Section 2
when, in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 58-65 (1982), it struck down an
Alaska law that conditioned payments from state oil revenues on length of
residency in the state. Justice Burger wrote that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause was inapplicable because "[tihe statute does not involve the kind of
discrimination which [the Clause] was designed to prevent." Id. at 60 n.5.
390 [Vol 88:384
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Burger continued: "That Clause 'was designed to insure to a citizen of State A
who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B
enjoy.'" Id. (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395).
While Zobel does not overtly distinguish between facial discrimination
and discriminatory effects, it seems to assume the existence of a regulatory
scheme that draws a distinction between in-state residents and those from
elsewhere. Courts and commentators have also assumed that facial discrimi-
nation is required. See Ponderosa Dairy v. Lyons, 259 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting a challenge to California milk laws: "The amendments do
not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or
citizenship."), rev'd sub nom. Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142
(2003); Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 102-03 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a
Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to the denial of admission to state
bar; bar rules applied to residents and nonresidents alike); Davrod Corp. v.
Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 791 (1st Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause challenge to state fishing boat length limitation: "The regulation
'was evidently passed for the preservation of the fish, and makes no discrimi-
nation in favor of citizens of Massachusetts and against citizens of other
States.'" (quoting Manchester v. Manchester, 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1891)));
Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Discrimination on the ba-
sis of out-of-state residency is a necessary element for a claim under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause."); Ga. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Ala. Real Estate
Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (M.D. Ala. 1990) ("[AIll of the cases of which
the Court is aware in which [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] has been
construed have been cases where states enacted statutes that overtly distin-
guished between residents and non-residents."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 350-51 (1st ed. 1997) ("Dis-
crimination against citizens of other states is a prerequisite for application of
the privileges and immunities clause." (emphasis added)); DANIEL A. FARBER,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 1044 (3d ed. 2003) ("Unlike
the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause only
applies when there is an overt discrimination .... Indirect burdens on inter-
state commerce do not count for privileges and immunities purposes."); JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 338 (6th ed. 2000)
(stating, as a threshhold requirement, the use of "a residency or citizenship
classification" to trigger Privileges and Immunities Clause scrutiny). But see
Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) ("If a
state statute or regulation imposes identical requirements on residents and
nonresidents alike and it has no discriminatory effect on nonresidents, it does
not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause." (emphasis added) (citing
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 1990))).
While this Essay was in production, the Supreme Court decided Hillside
Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142 (2003), and reversed the Ninth Circuit,
which had held that facial discrimination "on the basis of citizenship or resi-
dency" was required to trigger scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. See Ponderosa Dairy, 259 F.3d at 1156. The Court, per
Justice Stevens, noted that this holding was "inconsistent" with an older case,
Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern R.R. Co., 249 U.S. 522 (1919), in
which the Court applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a state tax
that "did not on its face draw any distinction based on citizenship or resi-
dence." Hillside Dairy, 123 S. Ct. at 2147 (emphasis added). The tax in
Chalker, while not facially discriminating on the basis of citizenship or resi-
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the distinction and (ii) that distinction must bear a substantial
relationship to the state's objective.23 However, an additional
limitation crept into the doctrine: The strictures of Article IV,
Section 2 are only triggered by differentiations between resi-
dents and nonresidents where the nonresident seeks to exercise
a "fundamental right."24 Thus, the Court upheld a Montana
statute that charged out-of-state hunters much higher license
fees than in-state hunters because the Court did not find elk
hunting to be a fundamental right. 5
dency, did facially discriminate based on the location of a taxpayer's chief of-
fice. Companies whose chief offices were located outside the state paid $100
per year while those located in-state paid only $25 per year. Chalker, 249 U.S.
at 525-26. The Court reasoned that since it was likely that persons who had
chief offices outside the state were citizens and residents of other states, the
practical effect of the tax's structure was to discriminate against those out-of-
state residents. Id. at 527. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit would have
excluded such subterfuges from scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause simply because the words "citizen" or "resident" were not used in the
statute, the Court was correct. In earlier cases, the Supreme Court rejected
arguments that the Clause should not apply to legislation based on residence,
because it mentioned only citizenship. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984) ("[I]t is now established
that the terms 'citizen' and 'resident' are essentially interchangeable for pur-
poses of analysis of most cases under the Privileges and Immunities Clause."
(citation omitted)). It is not clear, however, that any facially neutral regulation
not as transparent as the one in Chalker would be examined under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause for discriminatory effects. Hillside Dairy explic-
itly declined to decide "[wihether Chalker should be interpreted as merely ap-
plying the Clause to classifications that are but proxies for differential
treatment against out-of-state residents, or as prohibiting any classification
with the practical effect of discriminating against such residents." Hillside
Dairy, 123 S. Ct. at 2147. Specifically, I do not read Hillside Dairy to suggest
that the cases discussed in Part II, infra, would be decided the same way un-
der the Privileges and Immunities Clause as they were under the DCCD.
23. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 314-15
(1998) (striking down a New York commuter tax). The Lunding Court ob-
served:
[Wihen confronted with a challenge under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause to a law distinguishing between residents and nonresi-
dents, a State may defend its position, by demonstrating that '(i)
there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii)
the discrimination against nonresidents bears a substantial relation-
ship to the State's objective.
Id. at 298 (quoting Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)).
24. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (limit-
ing Article IV, Section 2's protection to the exercise of "fundamental rights").
25. See id. Justice Blackmun claimed to derive this limitation from Jus-
tice Washington's Corfield opinion. See id. at 387. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and White dissented, claiming that the focus should be on the state's reason
for the discrimination. See id. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Assuming that engaging in interstate commerce, especially
as it relates to commercial activity, is a "fundamental right,"26
substituting Article IV analysis for the two-tiered scrutiny of
the DCCD appears to be a fairly simple affair. If there is some
kind of differentiation-some kind of discrimination-between
in-state and out-of-state residents, then the burden would fall
on the regulating state to (i) give a substantial reason for that
discrimination and (ii) demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the differentiation and the discrimination. So stated,
the test seems to capture perfectly the core concern of the
DCCD: elimination of discriminatory or protectionist trade bar-
riers erected by states that inhibit the national common mar-
ket.27 There are, however, some dramatic but unadvertised
costs in making such a substitution.
II.
Wholesale substitution of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause for the DCCD involves some unintended consequences
that are either not discussed or are glossed over by its propo-
nents. Two immediate concerns arise: (i) the Clause, as cur-
rently interpreted by the Court, does not apply to corporations;
and (ii) the Clause may not reach conduct that the DCCD
strictly scrutinizes. Moreover, giving the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause pride of place in the enforcement of the antidis-
crimination principle would also mean that Congress and the
states would have less authority to regulate interstate com-
merce than is now possible under the DCCD. Specifically, the
Court has declined to read into the Clause a "market-
26. The Court has always assumed so in its Privileges and Immunities
cases dealing with in-state employee preferences. See, e.g., United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219 ("Certainly, the pursuit of a common
calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the
Clause.").
27. On at least one occasion, the Court has succinctly described the pur-
pose of the Commerce Clause doctrine:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no
home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by
customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every con-
sumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vi-
sion of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which
has given it reality.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
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participant" exception, like that created for the DCCD. In addi-
tion, the text of the Clause seems to foreclose the ability of
Congress to permit discrimination, as it can under the DCCD,
by clearly delegating that power to the states.
A. PAUL V. VIRGINIA AND THE CORPORATE "CITIZEN"
In 1866, Virginia passed a law prohibiting out-of-state in-
surance companies from operating in the state without a li-
cense, which would be granted only after depositing a large
sum of money with the State Treasurer.28 Virginia also made it
a crime to act as an agent for an unlicensed insurance com-
pany.29 An agent for a New York insurance company challenged
the laws under, inter alia, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.3" The Court rejected the challenge, observ-
ing that "corporations are not citizens within [Article IV's]
meaning. The term citizens as there used applies only to natu-
ral persons ... not artificial persons created by the legislature,
and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has
prescribed."
While conceding that "the object of the clause [was] to place
the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of
other States," the Court said that "[sipecial privileges enjoyed
by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States
by this provision."32 Under the law at the time, no state had to
allow an out-of-state corporation to operate within its borders;
a grant of a corporate charter by one state was just the sort of
"special privilege" that the Court was unwilling to force upon a
nonconsenting state through an expansive interpretation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Such an interpretation
would be "utterly destructive of the independence and the har-
28. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 168 (1868).
29. Id. at 169.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 176-77.
32. Id. at 180. At least one commentator has challenged Paul's conclusion
on this issue. See Chester J. Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1967) (arguing that the Clause was intended to protect the
natural rights of U.S. citizens, regardless of residency). But see Bogen, supra
note 11, at 841-45 (concluding that, based on the drafting history of the
Clause, Paul was correct on this issue).
33. Paul, 75 U.S. at 181 ("Now a grant of corporate existence is a grant of
special privileges to the corporators .... ").
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mony" of the states,34 inhibiting the ability of states to "limit
the number of corporations doing business" within the state or
to "repel an intruding corporation, except on the condition of re-
fusing incorporation for a similar purpose to their own citizens"
despite the fact that "it might be of highest public interest" for
the state to do so." Because those results were unthinkable, the
Court concluded that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did
not protect corporations.36
Despite the fact that much of the Court's discussion con-
cerning the rights of states to prohibit or regulate foreign cor-
porations had been superseded,37 the Supreme Court neverthe-
less affirmed Paul's exclusion of corporations from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause's protections as recently as
1981.38 In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, the Court declined to invalidate a Cali-
fornia retaliatory tax imposed on out-of-state life insurance
companies. 39The Court observed that "there are three provi-
sions of the Constitution under which a taxpayer may challenge
an allegedly discriminatory tax: the Commerce Clause... the
Privileges and Immunities Clause... and the Equal Protection
Clause."" The dormant Commerce Clause was not available to
the Ohio insurance company protesting the California taxes be-
cause Congress had "redelegated" power to the states to regu-
late the insurance business.4' The Privileges and Immunities
34. Id.
35. Id. at 182.
36. Id. at 178-82. The Court reasoned that "[iut is impossible ... upon any
sound principle, to give such a construction to the article in question-a con-
struction which would lead to results like these." Id. at 182 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court rejected the argument that the laws violated the
Commerce Clause, not on the ground that the Commerce Clause did not pro-
tect corporations, but because it concluded that the business of insurance was
not "commerce." See id. at 183. This holding has since been overruled. See
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (overrul-
ing Paul's insurance-is-not-commerce holding and upholding the Sherman Act
as applied to insurance companies).
37. See BITTKER, supra note 2, § 6.06[D].
38. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
656 (1981) (noting the inapplicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
to corporations).
39. Id. at 652, 674.
40. Id. at 655-56 (citations omitted). For a discussion of decisions on the
suitability of the Equal Protection Clause as a substitute for the DCCD, see
supra note 6.
41. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 652-53 ("If Congress ordains that
the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action
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Clause was unavailable because it was "inapplicable to corpora-
tions."42
B. THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
Under the DCCD, states that act as "market participants"
as opposed to "market regulators" may avoid the DCCD alto-
gether.4 3 The market-participant exception permits states to
favor local economic interests over out-of-state interests when
the state is buying or selling for its own account.4  The Supreme
Court, however, has declined to import this exception into
45Privileges and Immunities Clause cases.
In the 1984 case United Building & Construction Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden,48 the Court refused to apply the
market-participant exception in a Privileges and Immunities
Clause challenge to a municipal ordinance requiring forty per-
cent of work crews on city construction projects to be city resi-
dents.47 Earlier, the Court had held that the market-participant
doctrine applied in a case involving a similar Boston ordinance
and upheld the ordinance against a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.4"
The Court conceded that, as in the Boston case, "everyone
affected by the Camden ordinance is also 'working for the city'
and, therefore, has no grounds for complaint [under the
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is ren-
dered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge."); see also Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 437-40 (1946) (upholding the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011); BITrKER, supra note 2, § 9.04 (discussing the
power of Congress to "redelegate" power to the States); infra notes 57-62 and
accompanying text.
42. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 656.
43. See generally BITTKER, supra note 2, §§ 7.01-7.02 (discussing the his-
tory and scope of the market-participation exception).
44. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 214-
15 (1983) (upholding a local ordinance requiring contractors and subcontrac-
tors be composed of a certain number of city residents because the state acted
as a market participant); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980)
(upholding a state regulation giving state residents preference over nonresi-
dents in sales of cement from a state-owned plant); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976) (holding that state laws regarding
state purchase of abandoned automobiles could favor in-state sellers because
the state was participating in the market).
45. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,
465 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. White, 460 U.S. at 214-15.
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dormant Commerce Clause] when the city favors its own resi-
dents."49 The Court, however, "decline[d] to transfer mechani-
cally into this context [i.e., the Privileges and Immunities
Clause] an analysis fashioned to fit the Commerce Clause.""
The Court saw the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as serving different functions; the function
of the latter clause was not amenable to a market-participant
exception. 1 First, as Justice Rehnquist observed, insofar as a
state is merely participating in the market, it does not impli-
cate the Commerce Clause's implied restrictions on state regu-
lation of interstate commerce.52 More importantly, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause "imposes a direct restraint on
state action in the interests of interstate harmony."" In other
words, the Camden ordinance, which favored city residents at
the expense of those residing outside the city and the state, was
precisely the sort of law the Clause was intended to bar.54 Arti-
cle IV, Section 2's language, moreover, does not seem to antici-
pate an exception of the sort created for the DCCD by the Court
in response to its concern with comity, which "cuts across the
market regulator-market participant distinction."55 That Cam-
den was arguably only participating in the market by spending
its own resources on construction projects was irrelevant to the
Court when a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
is claimed.56
C. CONGRESSIONAL REDELEGATION TO STATES
The DCCD is unique in constitutional law because Con-
gress, not the Court, has the final say on whether a particular
state regulation of interstate commerce is permissible or not.
49. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219. The White
Court referred to everyone "working for the city" to explain why the applica-
tion of the ordinance to subcontractors as well as contractors-only the latter
were in privity of contract with the City of Boston-was not the sort of "down-
stream restriction" that exceeded the exception's scope. See S.-Cent. Timber
Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95 (1984) (citing United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219).
50. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219.
51. Id. at 220.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. ("It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters
of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting in-
terstate commerce.").
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Long ago, the Court held that Congress could, by exercising its
legislative power under the Commerce Clause, permit states to
regulate in ways that, absent congressional action, the DCCD
would prohibit . In part, this rule derives from an old, but sus-
pect, justification for the DCCD: Through inaction Congress
can be presumed to intend that the area be left unregulated. 5 A
contemporary explanation is grounded simply on Congress's
ability to regulate commerce in a way that delegates power over
commerce to the states. Whatever its theoretical basis, redele-
gation is now a clearly established part of the DCCD, and Con-
gress has exercised its power to permit states to regulate the
importation of liquor 9 and the business of insurance 60 to give
two twentieth-century examples. It is this ability of Congress to
overturn Supreme Court decisions that led even prominent ex-
ponents of judicial restraint to tolerate, even give grudging ap-
proval to, the DCCD.61
Were the Privileges and Immunities Clause substituted for
the DCCD, Congress probably would not have the same power.
57. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1891) (upholding a con-
gressional act empowering states to regulate the importation of liquor). See
generally BITTKER, supra note 2, § 9.04 (discussing congressional "redelega-
tion").
58. For an example of this congressional silence rationale, see Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing District, which stated:
Another established doctrine of this court is, that where the power of
Congress to regulate is exclusive the failure of Congress to make ex-
press regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free
from any restrictions or impositions; and any regulation of the subject
by the states, except in matters of local concern only, as hereafter
mentioned, is repugnant to such freedom.
120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887). For Justice Thomas's critique, see Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 614-17 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the preemption-by-silence reasoning
is flawed); see also Thomas Reed Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Com-
merce Clause, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE NATION
AND THE STATES 931, 932 (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1938) (also criticizing
the preemption-by-silence argument).
59. See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 326-32 (1917)
(upholding the Webb-Kenyon Act, which permitted states to regulate liquor
imported into their jurisdiction).
60. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 436 (1946) (uphold-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which authorized states to regulate the busi-
ness of insurance, notwithstanding the DCCD); see also W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981) (noting that Congress
may disable the DCCD limitations on states through an affirmative exercise of
its commerce power).
61. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 228-31 (2d ed. 1962).
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Article IV, Section 2, unlike the Commerce Clause, is not a
grant of power-indeed, it is not even addressed to Congress.
Rather, it is an unqualified prohibition of state discrimination
on the basis of state citizenship. Moreover, unlike other limita-
tions on state power listed in Article I, Section 10, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause contains no provision for congres-
sional waiver of its restriction."
D. UNDERPROTECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
One might argue that the foregoing obstacles to substitu-
tion are relatively minor. They could be overcome by forth-
rightly overruling some cases that probably deserve it, 63 by im-
porting familiar concepts into a new setting, 4 or by using other
congressional powers to permit in the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause context what the DCCD already allows. 5 Were it
simply a matter of substituting one textual provision for a line
of judicial doctrine, with no net loss in protection against "rank
discrimination,"6 but which enabled the Court to steer clear of
"judicial policymaking,"67 then substitution might not radically
affect the DCCD as currently applied by courts. However, as
with Justice Thomas's proposed substitution of the Import-
Export Clause for the DCCD,6 which I have criticized else-
where, 69 replacing the DCCD with the Privileges and Immuni-
62. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports .... "
(emphasis added)) and id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power, or engage in War ... ." (emphasis added)), with id. art.
IV, § 2 (omitting any reference to Congress).
63. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text (examining the lack of
protection for corporations under Article IV, Section 2).
64. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal
of the Court to create a market-participant exception for the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (analyzing whether Con-
gress would have the same ability to permit states to engage in prohibited dis-
crimination under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as it has under the
DCCD).
66. See supra note 7 (observing that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
believe that the DCCD lacks textual support).
67. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
620 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining about the inevitability of the
Court engaging in "policy-laden decisionmaking" when applying the DCCD).
68. Id.
69. Denning, supra note 10, at 215-23.
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ties Clause of Article IV would not offer interstate commerce
the same protection against state discrimination it currently
enjoys. This section explains the reasons why, and offers exam-
ples of cases invalidating discriminatory state laws that would
be upheld under a Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis
because the laws in question did not discriminate on their face.
Recall the present requirements for finding a violation of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. There must
be a "privilege or immunity" that is offered to the citizens of
State A (the legislating state) that is not extended to citizens of
State B, or State B's citizens must be burdened with a handicapS* 70
not placed on State A's citizens. In other words, as many
courts and commentators have assumed, the Clause seems to
require facial discrimination. If the citizens of both State A
and State B are deprived of something equally, then there is no
discrimination; citizens of State B have not been denied the
privileges and immunities of citizenship in State A. The DCCD
does not work this way. Under the DCCD, discrimination need
not be apparent on the face of a statute,2 nor is it a defense
that some in-state commerce is burdened along with out-of-
73
state commerce.
Consider the case of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Commission.74 There, the Court unanimously struck
down a North Carolina statute prohibiting the use of any grade
on closed containers of apples shipped in the state other than
that of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).75
In effect, the statute prevented apples from the State of Wash-
70. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. There needs to be a
"fundamental right" at issue, but Court decisions have treated the ability to
pursue a common calling or pursue a trade as qualifying. See supra notes 24-
25 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 22.
72. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (noting that strict scrutiny applies "[w]hen a state
statute directly ... discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its ef-
fect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests").
73. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951) (stat-
ing that whether some in-state commerce is burdened along with interstate
commerce is "immaterial"); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) ("[Olur prior cases teach
that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of
the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce
through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself.").
74. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
75. Id. at 348-54.
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ington from bearing the grade developed by that state, which
was regarded nationwide as superior to the USDA's grade. 6
North Carolina, which also produced apples, had no state grad-
ing system, leaving its apples unaffected by the regulation."
The Court agreed with the lower court that "the challenged
statute has the practical effect of... discriminating against"
the Washington apples both by raising the costs of doing busi-
ness in North Carolina (occasioned by the necessity of repack-
aging the apples) and by stripping away the competitive advan-
tage Washington earned by developing its grading and
inspection system."' The Court found that the prohibition had
"a leveling effect which insidiously operates to the advantage of
local apple producers" who would no longer have to compete
with out-of-state apples marked with a superior grading sys-
tem.79 Although the statute was facially neutral, the Court re-
quired North Carolina to demonstrate a legitimate local benefit
and that its legitimate purpose could not be achieved through
less discriminatory means.80 North Carolina could not meet its
burden, and the Court struck down the statute."'
Were that case heard without the DCCD, the North Caro-
lina statute would likely have been upheld. There was, after
all, no discrimination regarding the treatment of in-state and
out-of-state apples. All apples in the state were required to use
either the USDA grades or no grades at all. Since there was no
difference in treatment, the state, under existing Privileges and
Immunities doctrine, 2 would not be required to justify the dif-
ference in treatment.
Or consider Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,3 where the Court
struck down an ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk as "pas-
teurized" if the milk had not been processed within a five-mile
radius of the town square.' Although an out-of-state milk dis-
tributor brought the suit, the ordinance itself affected in-state
76. Id. at 351 ("The record demonstrates that the Washington apple-
grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the apple trade.").
77. Id. at 340 ("North Carolina, unlike Washington, had never established
a grading and inspection system. Hence, the statute had no effect on the exist-
ing practices of North Carolina producers ... .
78. Id. at 350-51.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 353.
81. Id. at 353-54.
82. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
83. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
84. Id. at 350.
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milk producers and distributors as well. Nevertheless, the
Court found it "immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside
the Madison area is subjected to the same proscription as that
moving in interstate commerce." 5 Not so if the Privileges and
Immunities Clause were the only available clause on which to
base a claim. The lack of discrimination between in-state and
out-of-state milk would bar scrutiny of Madison's suspect ordi-
nance.
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,S the Supreme Court heard a
challenge to an Arizona regulation prohibiting the export of
cantaloupes unless they had been packaged in the state prior to
shipment.87 Arizona argued unsuccessfully that the regulation
only reached intrastate packing activities and thus did not im-
plicate the DCCD. 8 Arizona, wrote the Court, "would require
that an operation now carried on outside the State must be per-
formed instead within the State so that it can be regulated
there."89 The Court continued: "If the appellant's theory were
correct, then statutes expressly requiring that certain kinds of
processing be done in the home State before shipment to a sis-
ter State would be immune from constitutional challenge. Yet
such statutes have been consistently invalidated by this Court
under the Commerce Clause."" The Court continued this trend
in Pike, concluding that the putative local benefits (here, the
protection of the reputation of Arizona's produce) were "clearly
exceeded" by the burden it placed on interstate commerce
(namely, the $200,000 it would have cost the company to build
a packing plant in Arizona). 91
The Court claimed to accept Arizona's sincerity in claiming
that the law sought only to protect and enhance the reputation
of its products, but the Court's actions in the case belied its
suspicion of Arizona's motives. The Court analogized the Ari-
zona law to "state statutes requiring business operations to be
performed in the home State that could more efficiently be per-
formed elsewhere"-such statutes the Court noted had "been
declared to be virtually per se illegal."92 Even assuming that the
85. Id. at 354 n.4.
86. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
87. Id. at 139-40.
88. Id. at 140.
89. Id. at 141.
90. Id. at 140-41.
91. Id. at 145.
92. Id.
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state was sincere, since the Court had struck down such stat-
utes where the articulated state interest was to provide em-
ployment for state residents, it found Arizona's ostensible pur-
pose-protecting the reputation of its produce-less defensible
in light of the burden placed on interstate commerce. s3 Yet, as
with the cases mentioned above, the statute was facially neu-
tral and did not draw the distinctions between in-state and out-
of-state residents that Article IV forbids. The Court recognized
as much, purporting to rely on its "balancing" test to avoid
troublesome inquires into actual (as opposed to ostensible)
state motives in enacting the law.94
This selection of cases is meant to be illustrative, not ex-
haustive. There are other state regulatory schemes that the
Court has struck down under the DCCD despite the lack of fa-
cial discrimination. 95 The examples offered here, however, are
93. See id. at 146. The Court noted that the added cost on the out-of-state
company "could perhaps be tolerated if a more compelling state interest were
involved," but ultimately the Court concluded:
The State's interest here is minimal at best-certainly less substan-
tial than a State's interest in securing employment for its people. If
the Commerce Clause forbids a State to require work to be done
within its jurisdiction to promote local employment, then surely it
cannot permit a State to require a person to go into a local packing
business solely for the sake of enhancing the reputation of other pro-
ducers within its borders.
Id.
94. Id. at 142. Interestingly, the Pike Court never really applied the bal-
ancing test it articulated, instead referring to the discriminatory, local-
processing regulations that would fall under its "virtually per se" rule of inva-
lidity. Id. at 145. Thus, I think that Donald Regan has it right when he char-
acterizes Pike as a case about discrimination, not balancing. See Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1209-20 (1986). For an-
other case in which discrimination against out-of-state commerce seemed to
figure prominently in the Court's decision, although a plurality purported to
employ balancing, see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981). Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result, but would
have justified their decision on a finding of impermissible discrimination. See
id. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).
In West Lynn Creamery, the Court struck down a tax-subsidy scheme that im-
posed a nondiscriminatory tax on all sales of milk within the state; the tax
proceeds were placed in a segregated fund from which subsidies were drawn
for the benefit of in-state milk producers. Id. The Court found that in practical
effect, the facially neutral tax actually burdened only out-of-state interests be-
cause in-state producers were eligible for subsidies. Id. at 194. Despite the fact
that neither subsidies nor nondiscriminatory taxes, in isolation, ordinarily
poses a problem under the DCCD, the two here were "linked" in such a way to
trigger DCCD scrutiny. The problem of "suspect linkages" has been specifically
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sufficient to show that substitution of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause for the DCCD would change the outcome in a
number of cases where, to a greater or lesser degree, "rank dis-
crimination" was involved. If the critics of the DCCD are, as
they often claim, uninterested in permitting states to discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce or engage in economic protec-
tionism,96 then they should assume the responsibility of ex-
plaining how these burdens would be addressed, if at all, under
Article IV. If the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not
reach the fact situations discussed above, then either the ar-
gument that substitution would provide sufficient protection
against discrimination needs to be qualified, or proponents of
substitution should admit the underprotection and provide an
argument that the costs to interstate commerce are outweighed
by the virtues of discarding the DCCD for the short-sheet pro-
tection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
III.
As noted above, the usual brief against the DCCD involves
one or more of the following arguments: it is ahistorical, it lacks
a textual foundation, it invites uncabined "judicial policymak-
ing" as courts are sometimes called upon to "balance" local
benefits against interstate burdens, and it is insufficiently re-
spectful of federalism. Enthusiasm for substitution, then, stems
from the perception that Article IV would be superior to the
DCCD because it appears to have been intended to address the
evil presently addressed by the DCCD, it is textual, and its text
will prevent judges from straying beyond the purpose of the
Clause, i.e., combatting "rank discrimination" by states against
citizens from other states.97
As noted in the previous Part, however, the problem is that
addressed by other scholars. See Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect
Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Applica-
tion of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1997);
see also Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age], 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 14 (2003) (applying the lessons of West Lynn Creamery to
argue that the Maine Rx Prescription drug plan is unconstitutional).
96. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 264
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating the
substitution of the Privileges and Immunities Clause for the DCCD but claim-
ing not to endorse state discrimination or economic protectionism).
97. See, e.g., id. at 265 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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Article IV, Section 2 and the DCCD are not interchangeable.
Substitution, in fact, would render interstate commerce vulner-
able to discrimination, leave states free to engage in economic
protectionism, and prevent both Congress and the states from
regulating interstate commerce in ways they currently enjoy
under the DCCD. This Part discusses how the proponents of
substitution address these gaps (to the extent that they address
them at all) and notes how their remedies would require judges
to disregard the Constitution's text, history, and structure-
precisely what judges enforcing the DCCD are now accused of
doing.
A. THE CORPORATIONS PROBLEM
In his influential critique of the DCCD, Professor Julian
Eule wrote that only the "anachronistic definition of the term
'citizen' in the privileges and immunities guarantees of Article
IV, Section 2... justifies the preservation of" the doctrine that
corporations are not covered by Article IV, Section 2.9s "Paul,"
Eule wrote aphoristically, "has become a holding without a ra-
tionale."99 Much of Justice Brennan's opinion in Western &
Southern Life Insurance Co., Eule argued, "stripped Justice
Field's position [in Paul] of every one of its legal underpin-
nings." '°° But Brennan's opinion nevertheless declined to un-
dertake a reexamination of Paul's conclusion that corporations
were excluded from Article IV's protections. The Court's reaf-
firmation of Paul on this point, noted Eule, was "gratuitous"
because it was not a claim advanced by the petitioner."°" Eule
hoped that Paul would eventually be put out of its misery,
"enabling the privileges and immunities clause to become the
favored implement for judicial dissection of state commercial
regulation.",1 2 It has been more than twenty years since Eule's
critique, but the Court has not revisited the issue or even
obliquely called into question that portion of Paul. Nor is there
any discontinuity between the Court's interpretation of the
term "citizens" in Article IV, Section 2 and its interpretation of
the same word in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
10 3
98. Eule, supra note 4, at 428.
99. Id. at 453.
100. Id. at 452.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Id. at 454.
103. In 1939, the Court held that corporations were not citizens for pur-
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Despite the shift in judicial doctrine concerning the extent
to which states can limit or restrict out-of-state corporations
from operating within their territory, Eule nowhere demon-
strates that, as a matter of original intent, Justice Field was
mistaken. This is important, insofar as part of Eule's attack on
the DCCD's protection of a national free market is premised on
the lack of intent on the part of the Framers to provide any
such protection. "The Framers," he wrote, "did not explicitly
protect free trade" °4 and expressed "no intent ... to inject a
philosophy of laissez-faire into the constitutional fabric." 10 5
Redish and Nugent, for their part, also recognize the corpo-
rations problem, but offer that "it can be reasonably argued
that corporations should, in fact, be afforded the protections of
Article IV.", 0 6 Because, "[firom a policy perspective, there can be
little doubt that corporations should receive the protections of
the privileges and immunities clause," only an argument that
the text prohibits corporate coverage would, for them, counsel
against overruling Paul.10 7 But text, it turns out, poses no real
problem for them. Given Redish and Nugent's furious denun-
ciation of the DCCD's complete lack of textual foundation, it is
surprising to see them adopt a much more relaxed attitude to-
wards the text of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, insofar
as it proves inconvenient to their argument for substitution.
The term "person" in the fourteenth amendment has. been consis-
tently interpreted to include corporations, and the term "citizens" in
the diversity jurisdictional statute, which in turn is premised on the
use of the same term in article III of the Constitution, includes corpo-
rations by its language. Why, then, should we hesitate to treat the
same term in article IV in the same manner?
1 08
This is a curious argument. First, how courts have inter-
preted the term "persons" when construing the Fourteenth
Amendment is irrelevant to whether a different word, "citi-
zens," used in a different constitutional provision, can be simi-
larly construed. Had the Court interpreted "citizens" to cover
corporations in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
104. Eule, supra note 4, at 429.
105. Id. at 435; see also id. at 434 ("The commerce clause... cannot be said
to establish and protect free trade or a national marketplace as a fundamental
constitutional value.").
106. Redish & Nugent, supra note 1, at 611.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Immunities Clause,10 9 their argument might have some force.
But in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,"0 the
Court held that corporations were not citizens for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause."'
Additionally, even though the diversity jurisdiction statute
includes corporations as citizens for diversity purposes, 2 there
is a difference between a congressional definition of a term in a
statute authorized by a constitutional grant of power"' and a
judicial construction of the same term in a constitutional limi-
tation-just as Redish and Nugent argue there is a difference
between Congress limiting state power over commerce through
the exercise of its constitutionally delegated power and courts
enforcing a similar limitation based on structural inferences
from the same provision."1 4 Moreover, their solution to the cor-
porations problem, like Eule's, evinces little concern with
whether the Framers intended the term "citizens" to cover cor-
porations." 5
It would surely produce no cosmic rift in judicial doctrine
to simply overrule what remains of Paul v. Virginia and treat
corporations as citizens. Proponents of this solution, however,
provide little evidence that the term "citizens," as used in 1789,
included legal fictions like corporations. Thus, insofar as sub-
stitution seems to require an anachronistic reading of Article
IV's term "citizen," it would begin life tainted with the same in-
fidelity to originalism with which critics tar the DCCD."6
B. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS
What I have characterized as the most serious objection to
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
111. See id. at 514.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
114. Redish & Nugent, supra note 1, at 573.
115. Cf. id. at 585-86 (concluding, after reviewing evidence, that "the his-
torical evidence provides no firm support for the dormant commerce clause's
existence"). In fairness to their discussion of the corporations problem, they
emphasize that the "scope of the privileges and immunities clause is not the
primary focus of this article and therefore an exhaustive examination of the
corporations issue is not included." Id. at 611.
116. Justice Scalia, although an advocate for substitution, has not indi-
cated whether he favors overruling Paul and including corporations within the
ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
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substitution-that it leaves interstate commerce underpro-
tected against ostensibly neutral, but effectively discrimina-
tory, regulation-has not been acknowledged by proponents of
substitution. Eule did not discuss it. Justice Scalia, as well as
Redish and Nugent, merely talk of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause reaching discriminatory legislation, without indi-
cating whether they read the Clause as also reaching discrimi-
nation in effect.
117
Like the corporations problem, though, remedying this gap
would not be terribly difficult. It is axiomatic that the Constitu-
tion prohibits subtle as well as blatant violations of its provi-
sions;"8 therefore, form could give way to substance when en-
forcing them. Even self-proclaimed textualists warn against
literalism in construing either statutes or constitutional provi-
sions. 119 Thus, a judge could, with ease, proclaim that the Privi-
117. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 1, at 610. It appears as if Redish and
Nugent assume the protection against discrimination in the DCCD and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to be coterminous. Id. (N[I]t appears that the
Court has recognized the same right under both the privileges and immunities
and dormant commerce clauses-the right of an out-of-state resident to be free
from discriminatory state regulations of commerce."). Others criticizing substi-
tution have mentioned in passing that the DCCD has a broader scope than the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, but do not discuss the problem of facially
neutral legislation in detail. For example, see Jenna Bednar & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial En-
forcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1488 (1995), which rejects
"the suggestion of several commentators that the Court abandon its dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence and focus instead on the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause" because
the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been construed to protect
only against state rules ... distinguishing between citizens and non-
citizens of states. Without major rethinking, privileges and immuni-
ties jurisprudence would not be up to the task of displacing the dor-
mant commerce clause as the doctrinal basis for the Court's
regulation of state protectionism and externalities.
Id. at 1488.
Mark Gergen argues that one problem with substitution is "the clause's
apparent inability to correct evenhanded measures that pose an intolerable
burden on interstate commerce." Gergen, supra note 11, at 1117-18. His refer-
ence to an "intolerable burden" suggests that he had in mind the Pike balanc-
ing test instead of the discriminatory effects problem. See id. at 1118.
118. Cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000) (noting
that the "Constitution... requires that [the Court] keep in mind 'the myriad,
subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded'" (citations
omitted)).
119. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (rejecting "ahistorical
literalism" in application of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAw 23, 24 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that "[a] text
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leges and Immunities Clause prohibited those regulations that
were protectionist or discriminatory in their effects, despite the
fig leaf of facial neutrality.
But once a judge departs this much from the text of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which anticipates a distinc-
tion between in-state and out-of-state residents, in order to en-
force its apparent purpose, what principle remains to prevent
the same judge from later weighing benefits and burdens? The
rule-like benefits of a textual provision would be endangered,
and one of the purported benefits of substitution compromised.
At the same time, allowing states to subvert the Clause by sub-
tle discrimination would defeat the very purpose of the Clause.
C. THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
AND CONGRESSIONAL REDELEGATION
The other problems with substitution described in Part
II-the lack of a congressional override of Court cases involving
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the lack of a market-
participant doctrine-are less easily remedied. These problems
illustrate instances in which substitution will hamstring Con-
gress and the states-precisely the criticism leveled against the
DCCD, i.e., that it usurps congressional power and unduly lim-
its State police powers.
The Supreme Court has declined to engraft a market-
participant exception onto the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. This means that certain "privileges and immunities"
that states offer their citizens-subsidized college tuition or
preferential admissions to state universities, for example-
would be subject to scrutiny under Article IV, Section 2,120 as
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it
should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means" and that
"the good textualist is not a literalist"). Elsewhere, Justice Scalia, commenting
upon constitutional interpretation, wrote: "In textual interpretation, context is
everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-
picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than nar-
row interpretation-though not an interpretation that the language will not
bear." Id. at 37.
120. Whether potential plaintiffs would be successful depends, in part, on
whether the ability to pursue an education in a particular state was a "funda-
mental right." See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. The Court has
held that education is not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (holding that
education is not a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (refusing to rec-
ognize a fundamental right to education under the Due Process Clause).
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would programs designed to benefit in-state commercial ac-
tors.12 1 The Court's reluctance to perform this doctrinal trans-
plant is understandable. The purpose of the Clause, after all, is
to prevent precisely the kind of parochial legislation that is
permitted under the market-participant exception. The excep-
tion thus permits that which the text of the Clause seems ex-
plicitly to forbid: states conferring "privileges" on their own
citizens that they deny to noncitizens. Ignoring the Clause's
limitations and creating a market-participant doctrine would
detract from the supposed advantages of a textual provision.
Ironically, without the market-participant doctrine, Article IV,
Section 2 seems to tie the hands of states more tightly than the
DCCD. Thus, substitution could prove to be as indifferent to
federalism principles as the DCCD is alleged to be, unless the
Court aggressively expanded the "fundamental rights" re-
quirement to contract the universe of privileges and immuni-
ties that out-of-state residents could claim. This solution, how-
ever, also departs from the text of the Clause: Article IV,
Section 2 nowhere suggests its prohibitions extend only to fun-
damental rights.
Neither Justice Scalia nor Redish and Nugent address this
particular asymmetry between the two provisions. 122 Again, the
point is not that the Court's refusal to extend the market-
participant doctrine to the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
unassailable, 123 but rather that the unavailability of the excep-
tion would pose a doctrinal obstacle to seamless substitution.
Inasmuch as critics of the DCCD object to the doctrine's alleged
inroads on state sovereignty and federalism, 24 the lack of a
market-participant exception to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause makes substitution less attractive than it appears at
first glance. Remedying the problem would involve overruling
121. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding under
the market-participant exception a state regulation limiting sales of cement
from state-owned plants to in-state residents before selling to out-of-state
residents).
122. Professor Eule's article appeared prior to the Court's ruling that the
market-participant exception does not apply to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
123. See, e.g., Patrick Sullivan, Comment, In Defense of Resident Hiring
Preferences: A Public Spending Exception to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
124. Though not a critic of the DCCD, Dan Coenen describes how the mar-
ket-participant doctrine respects federalism and state sovereignty. Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 421-30 (1988).
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case law and, possibly, engrafting judicial exceptions onto a
clear textual prohibition.
12 5
Finally, substitution would also limit congressional power
because Congress now possesses the ability to disable the
DCCD through the exercise of its Commerce Clause power.1
2 6
Were the Privileges and Immunities Clause substituted for the
DCCD, would Congress have the same power? Professor Eule
suggested that it might. "The privileges and immunities
clause," he wrote, "has not been applied to limit federal power.
Congress therefore arguably enjoys broader scope to provide for
resident/non-resident distinctions than do the states."2 7
But Eule does not explain why this is so, or identify where
the Constitution might authorize Congress to make those dis-
tinctions. Eule's conclusion is particularly curious, coming as it
does in the course of his explanation of why the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV is a more effective tool for
combatting state discrimination than the Equal Protection
Clause.2 ' Using the latter, he noted, would involve review of
state regulations under the rational basis standard, while
courts reviewing laws under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause employed a more demanding standard of review (Eule
likened it to "intermediate scrutiny" under the Fourteenth
Amendment).2 9 Moreover, Eule continued, according to the
Supreme Court, Congress "clearly lacks the power to 'authorize
the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion clause."3 °
125. It is true, perhaps, that the market-participant exception would not be
necessary for upholding city-funded projects like that at issue in United Build-
ing & Construction Trades Council. After all, the Court there did not strike
down the Camden measure. Rather, the Court merely placed the burden of
proof on the city to demonstrate that the discrimination was necessary to rem-
edy the particular problems presented by workers working in Camden and liv-
ing elsewhere. Id. at 222-23. For an argument that the right to a city job is not
a "fundamental right" covered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see
Sullivan, supra note 123, at 1356-60.
126. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
127. Eule, supra note 4, at 455 (citations omitted). The values of Eule's pre-
ferred "process model" for the DCCD were protected, he wrote, because "[i]n
Congress, the citizens of all states are represented. Disparate treatment of a
particular state's residents authorized by this broader-based body deserves a
greater presumption of validity." Id. (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 454-55; see also supra note 6 (discussing the Equal Protection
Clause as an alternative to the DCCD).
129. Eule, supra note 4, at 454.
130. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Like the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is a straightforward restric-
tion on the power of states to discriminate on the basis of state
citizenship. Eule provides no reason why Congress should be
barred from authorizing states to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment but permitted to authorize them to violate Article
IV, Section 2. As noted above, the Framers knew how to allow
Congress to waive restrictions on the states and did so in other
provisions, but not in Article IV, Section 2.'1' The flexibility
that the redelegation doctrine has introduced into the DCCD
has been celebrated by scholars. 32 Congress has, on occasion,
taken advantage of this flexibility to allow states more leeway
in the regulation of certain forms of commerce. 33 If the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause alone became the workhorse for
enforcing a commercial nondiscrimination principle, congres-
sional redelegation would likely have to be jettisoned.
Where does this leave proponents of substitution? These
arguments show that the advocates for the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause are, first and foremost, critics of the DCCD. To
the extent that they have considered the historical, textual, and
doctrinal problems with replacing the DCCD with Article IV,
Section 2, they either minimize them or suggest judicial quick
fixes to eliminate the discontinuities. They often fail, however,
to see how these solutions sit uneasily beside the critiques of
the DCCD that they argue mandate substitution in the first
place. Remedying the corporations problem would entail infi-
delity to original intent, unless there is a historical case to be
made that the Framers did intend "citizens" to include fictional
entities like corporations. Covering effectual, as opposed to fa-
cial, discrimination; extending the market-participant excep-
tion to Article IV, Section 2; and allowing Congress to permit
what the Clause forbids, moreover, all involve ignoring the text
of the Constitution. If judges feel compelled to push the nondis-
crimination principle of Article IV, Section 2 a bit beyond its
text to compensate for the gaps occasioned by substitution,
131. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325-32
(1917) (upholding the Webb-Kenyon Act, which permitted states to regulate
liquor imported into their jurisdiction).
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then would anything have been gained by replacing the DCCD
with the Privileges and Immunities Clause? Or as Dan Farber
put it, "Why bother finding a textual hook if you're going to
hang the same clothes on it anyway?" 134 If the Privileges and
Immunities Clause is, in the hands of the DCCD's critics,
merely a convenient stick used to beat an unloved doctrinal
dog, then the problems with substitution described here should
be forthrightly engaged, especially the extent to which it leaves
interstate commerce vulnerable to subtle discrimination.
There is, however, another possibility: Particular textual
hooks may be suggested precisely because they are seen to hold
less than that which they replace. Justice Thomas's enthusiasm
for the Import-Export Clause as a replacement for the DCCD,
for example, stems in part from his opinion that it would pro-
hibit only discriminatory taxation, and not discriminatory regu-
lation.135 Advocates of substitution may be aware of the changes
substitution would work on the current DCCD beyond the jetti-
soning of Pike balancing and might welcome them.1 6 Ifso,then
that position requires some explanation and defense. Most sub-
stitution advocates, however, strongly imply that all that would
be lost in the transition from the DCCD to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause is Pike's much-maligned balancing test.
There is one final point worth mentioning. Advocates of
substitution, like Justice Thomas in proffering the Import-
Export Clause as a substitute for the DCCD,3 7 seem bent on
finding a textual hook for what, in essence, is a structural prin-
134. Personal Communication from Jim Chen to Brannon Denning (relat-
ing comment of Farber).
135. Denning, supra note 10, at 181, 215-23.
136. Decisions handed down at the end of the 2002 term tend to confirm
my initial suspicions. Justice Thomas has now made clear that he simply will
no longer enforce the DCCD. See Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142,
2148 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that the doctrine has "no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little
sense, and [is] virtually unworkable in application" (quoting Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting))); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855,
1878 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). Justice Scalia, too, took the op-
portunity in Walsh to affirm-perhaps harden-his position on the DCCD. His
concurring opinion implies that only in cases of facial discrimination or in
cases involving nondiscriminatory action "of the precise sort hitherto invali-
dated" will he apply the DCCD. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1874 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
137. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 637-40 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Denning, supra note 10 (discussing and critiquing Tho-
mas's proposal).
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ciple-that the union created by the Constitution sought to pro-
tect interstate commerce from protectionist regulation by
states. As Don Regan once observed, "Just as 'nature abhors a
vacuum,' so we are taught to abhor constitutional principles
without a specific textual grounding. When such a principle is
implicated in some case, we therefore rush in with misguided
suggestions for a textual grounding inspired by the context at
hand."'38 The textual evidence of the DCCD as a valid struc-
tural principle is at least as good as, perhaps better than, the
evidence that Justices Thomas and Scalia have adduced in
support of a broad principle of sovereign immunity. It is as
strong as the evidence brought forth in support of background
principles of federalism that operate to limit the exercise of
powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8. One can see, for ex-
ample, evidence of the principles embodied in the DCCD in the
delegation of power over interstate commerce to Congress and
by corresponding restrictions on states, such as the Import-
Export Clause, the Tonnage Clause, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. If the primary objection to the DCCD, and
the search for a textual substitute, stem from its alleged lack of
foundation in the Constitution's text or history, then critics like
Justices Scalia and Thomas ought to indicate why the princi-
ples protected by the DCCD are less apparent in the structure
of the Constitution, and less deserving of judicial protection,
than sovereign immunity or federalism principles.'39
IV.
Critics of the DCCD have advocated allowing the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to serve as the
constitutional bulwark against interstate commercial discrimi-
nation. As demonstrated here, however, the substitution of one
for the other entails losing both flexibility for Congress and the
states, as well as substantial protection for interstate com-
merce. While the problems could be remedied were substitution
to be effected, these remedies would come at the expense of the
alleged advantages of abandoning the DCCD for the Privileges
138. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1889 (1987).
139. For a very preliminary structural defense of the DCCD, see Brannon
P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Constitutional
Structure (Feb. 19, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), auail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=260830.
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and Immunities Clause in the first place, i.e., that Article IV,
Section 2 is textually based and would cabin judicial discretion
in its application, and that its historical pedigree is superior to
that of the DCCD. In addition, the unavailability, under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, of certain exceptions to the
DCCD (like the market-participant exception and Congress's
redelegation power) would limit states and Congress to a
greater degree than does the DCCD. These problems, which
have not been adequately addressed by proponents, demon-
strate that substitution of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause for the DCCD is far from an even trade. Critics of the
DCCD who advocate substitution should acknowledge the
shortcomings of their remedy, and assess whether the benefits
outweigh those costs.
